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TEMPORAL ARBITRARINESS: A BACK TO THE 
FUTURE LOOK AT A TWENTY-FIVE-YEAR-OLD DEATH 
PENALTY TRIAL 
Mary Kelly Tate * 
INTRODUCTION 
This symposium essay is a thought experiment-a "back to the 
future" re-imagining of the capital murder trial of Tommy David 
Strickler, an indigent man deemed borderline mentally retarded. 1 
In 1990, Strickler was convicted and sentenced to death for the 
robbery, abduction, and murder of a young African American 
woman. 2 On July 21, 1999, Strickler became the sixty-eighth per-
son executed in Virginia in the death penalty's modern era.3 
In post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings, Strickler came 
uncommonly close to judicial relief when the Supreme Court of 
the United States agreed to review the prosecution's failure to 
* Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Director of Institute for Actual Innocence .• J.D., 
1991, University of Virginia. I thank Professor Corinna Barrett Lain, my dear friend and 
colleague, for her generous spirit and invaluable assistance during the writing process. I 
also extend my appreciation to my research assistant Zachary MacDonald for his able re-
search and editing support. 
1. See Strickler v. Greene, 57 F. Supp. 2d 313, 318 (E.D. Va. 1999) (granting Strick-
ler's counsel's application for lawyer's fees in post-conviction clemency proceedings in 
recognition of Strickler's indigent status); see also Ian Record, Strichler Gets Death Sen-
tence, BREEZE, Sept. 20, 1990, at 2 ("Strickler has an IQ of 74, Warren testified. People 
with IQs of 70 can be considered mentally retarded, she said."). 
2. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 266 (1999). 
3. Searchable Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpe 
naltyinfo.org/views-executions?exec_name_l=&sex=All&state%5B%5D=VA&sex_l=All& 
federal=All&foreigner=All&juvenile=All&volunteer=All (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) (listing 
Strickler as the sixty-eighth person executed in Virginia since 1976). Furman v. Georgia is 
a 1972 Supreme Court decision holding, through a fractured plurality opinion, that arbi-
trariness in imposing the death penalty rendered it unconstitutional in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); 
id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring). In 1976, the Supreme Court overturned its Furman 
decision with Gregg v. Georgia, holding that new statutory schemes adding procedures for 
courts and juries in applying the death penalty limited its arbitrariness, which made it 
permissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 428 U.S. 153, 169, 204-07 
(1976). Accordingly, the "modern era" refers to cases decided after the Supreme Court's 
decision in Gregg v. Georgia. 
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provide exculpatory statements from its star witness. 1 Within the 
fractured forty-four-page opinion, the Court concluded that the 
statements in question, although exculpatory as a matter of law 
due to their contradiction of trial testimony, would not have al-
tered the outcome of Strickler's trial if the defense had possessed 
them during trial preparation, cross-examination, opening and 
closing statements, and sentencing.5 Thirty-four days later, 
Strickler was executed.6 
I wonder how Strickler's Augusta County, Virginia trial would 
have been different had it happened today. How does the circum-
stance of time affect capital defendants? And what might that say 
about the stability of our notions of justice when it comes to our 
most severe, irreversible punishment? I pose these questions be-
cause I was one of Strickler's federal habeas corpus counsel in the 
1990s. 
To illustrate the role of the temporal in capital trial outcomes, I 
use Strickler's trial, specifically its core narrative, as a case 
study. It affords us a glimpse into many of the structural hall-
marks and pitfalls of capital litigation in twentieth-century 
America. Other than the human suffering for the victim's family, 
the community, and Strickler himself, Strickler's trial is prosaic 
in many of its cultural characteristics. A tragic and senseless 
murder, an indigent defendant with cognitive vulnerabilities, an 
ambitious pro-death penalty prosecutor, and a rural setting are 
all in play. Its one feature that deviates from the prototypical cap-
ital case is its racial contours. The defendant was white and the 
victim was black; usually those features run the other way.7 This 
inversion is likely explained by socioeconomic factors. As the 
death penalty's history demonstrates, the identity of the victim 
4. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 265-66. 
5. Id. at 293-96. 
6. Compare id. at 263 (decided June 17, 1999), with Thomas Strickler, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTH., http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/thomas-strickler (last visited Feb. 27, 
2015) (indicating Strickler was executed on July 21, 1999). 
7. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 266 (indicating Leanne Whitlock was African American); 
Thomas Strickler, supra note 6 (indicating Strickler was white); see Searchable Execution 
Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. C'I'R., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions? 
exec name_l =&race%5B%5D=White&sex=m&state%5B%5D=VA&race_l %5B%5D= Black 
&se; l=f&federal=All&foreigner=All&juvenile=All&volunteer=All (last visited Feb. 27, 
2015)(demonstrating that only four white men have been executed for the murder of only 
black victims in Virginia). 
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matters in terms of when the penalty is deployed and here the 
victim was an upwardly mobile college student full of promise.8 
On the whole, the Strickler case is a fitting specimen to exam-
ine how time intersects with the death penalty as an institution. 
My aim is focused mostly on how the trial narrative would have 
been altered in today's doctrinal, capital defense, and normative 
environments. I train my sight on the "story" to understand the 
role of the temporal in capital litigation because narrative is 
where capital trials rise or fall. Narrative, as shaped through ad-
versarial engagement with evidence, is the essential determinant 
during plea-bargaining, the guilt or innocence phase, and the sen-
tencing phase of capital trials. 9 Capital litigation lawyers and 
post-conviction lawyers know it is the "story'' that drives out-
comes.10 The story of the case was at the heart of Strickler's post-
conviction efforts and at the heart of Strickler's capital murder 
trial. 
The body of this essay is divided into three parts. Part I is a 
narrative summary of the case with factual and procedural high-
lights. Part II situates the case in the temporal space in which it 
occurred by addressing three structural realities-death penalty 
jurisprudence, improved capital defense in Virginia, and deep cul-
tural shifts concerning the criminal justice system's fallibility and 
the death penalty's legitimacy and role-which are substantially 
different today than they were at the time of Strickler's trial. 
In closing, Part III draws conclusions, compressed in scope and 
depth due to the short-form nature of this essay, about how the 
Strickler capital trial and its temporal dimensions further reveal 
the death penalty's crumbling edifice of legitimacy. The Strickler 
experience painfully signals that forty years of judicial, legisla-
tive, and executive fits and starts aimed at making the death 
8. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 887 (11th Cir. 1985) (defendant presented 
statistical studies demonstrating that whether the victim was black or white may have an 
impact on applying the death penalty generally); cf. Ian Record, Two Indicted in Whitlock 
Abduction, BREEZE, Jan. 18, 1990, at 1 (describing Leann Whitlock as a sophomore psy-
chology major and a member of a campus singing group). 
9. See generally Michael N. Burt, The Importance of Storytelling at All Stages of a 
Capital Case, 77 UMKC L. REV. 877 (2009) (explaining how telling a dominant narrative 
that emphasizes the crime and its brutality can impact stages of a capital murder case). 
10. See id. at 879. 
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penalty democratically "hygienic" have failed. Temporal arbitrar-
iness courses through each and every death penalty case. 
For those subjected to its reach, the story of the death penalty 
is one marked by the vagaries of time, place, and mood: disturb-
ingly ephemeral bases for the ultimate sanction. 
I. NARRATIVE BACKGROUND: A LOOK AT THE FACTS AND THE LAW 
OF STRICKLER'S CAPITAL TRIAL 
On January 5, 1990, Leanne Whitlock, a James Madison Uni-
versity undergraduate student, disappeared after having bor-
rowed her boyfriend's car. 11 Eight days later, her body was found 
in a secluded area in Augusta County, Virginia. 12 Strickler was 
arrested prior to the discovery of Whitlock's body and became 
connected to the disappearance by various witnesses who linked 
Strickler to the car and various belongings of Whitlock. 13 An au-
topsy and the physical investigation of the area where Whitlock's 
body was found led to the prosecution's theory that Strickler and 
another man, Ronald L. Henderson, had killed Whitlock with a 
sixty-nine-pound boulder. 14 Henderson was tried separately, con-
victed of first degree murder, and received three life sentences. 15 
To grapple temporally with this case requires an understand-
ing of the prosecutor's narrative not only as to Strickler's guilt or 
innocence or the original charging decision, but also as to why 
Strickler was the "worst of the worst" and thus deserving of exe-
cution as a sentencing matter. This universal "winnowing" bur-
den on prosecutors in death penalty cases is one reason for the 
emphasis on narrative in this summary. 
A major component of this funneling process in the Strickler 
trial turned on a single witness named Anne Stoltzfus. She was 
the star witness who cemented the prosecutor's claim that Strick-
11. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 266-67. 
12. Id. at 276; Strickler v. Commonwealth, 404 S.E.2d 227, 231 0/a. 1991). 
13. Strickler, 404 S.E.2d. at 231 (indicating that Strickler was arrested on January 
11); Record, supra note 8, at 1 (stating that Whitlock's body was discovered by police on 
January 13). 
14. Strichler, 527 U.S. at 293 & n.43; Striclder, 404 S.E.2d at 231. 
15. See Mistake Shocks Slaying Victim's Parents, FREE LANCE-STAR, Aug. 6, 1993, at 
ClO. 
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ler was depraved. 16 Or, as stated by Justice Souter in his and Jus-
tice Kennedy's dissent in which they concluded Strickler was de-
prived of a fair trial, her testimony provided the "narrative force" 
which sealed Strickler's fate. 17 Justice Souter further wrote, "Ul-
timately, I cannot accept the Court's discount of Stoltzfus ... 
[and] the undeniable narrative force of what she said .... What is 
important is that her evidence presented a gripping story."18 
According to Stolzfus's testimony at trial, Whitlock was last 
seen at a local shopping center. 19 She testified to seeing Whitlock 
at the mall. 20 She also provided eyewitness information to police 
and eventual testimony at trial concerning Strickler's and Hen-
derson's conduct at the mall. 21 Stolzfus testified that she saw 
Strickler and Henderson behaving disruptively inside the mall 
while she and her fourteen-year-old daughter shopped, and that 
she later saw Strickler aggressively push and manhandle his way 
into Whitlock's car outside that same mall. 22 She further testified 
that the events were alarming enough that she vacated her own 
vehicle and repeatedly asked Whitlock if she was okay.23 
Not only did she not call the police immediately after purport-
edly witnessing a violent abduction, Stoltzfus did not come for-
ward until after Strickler's arrest, heavy news coverage of the 
crime, discovery of the body, and a publicized interstate highway 
search for Henderson. 21 Almost two weeks passed before she told 
her story to the authorities. 25 Henderson was eventually appre-
hended in Oregon while Strickler was arrested in possession of 
Whitlock's car. 26 
16. See Strichler, 527 U.S. at 290. 
17. Id. at 307 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
18. Id. 
19. See Trial Transcript at 483-84, Commonwealth v. Strickler (\la. Cir. 1990) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Strichler Trial Transcript]. 
20. Id. at 484-85. 
21. Id. at 485-88; Strickler v. Netherland, no. 3:95CV924, slip op. at 5-10 (E.D. Va. 
filed Oct. 15, 1997). 
22. Strichler Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 476-80, 482, 485-87. 
23. Id. at 488-90. 
24. Id. at 494-97. 
25. Id. at 476; Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 273 (1999) (demonstrating that 
Stoltzfus testified to seeing the incident on January 5 but did not interview with a police 
officer until January 19). 
26. Man Charged With Driving Student's Car, FREE LANCE-STAR, Jan. 12, 1991, at 24; 
Striclller Given Death Penalty, FREE LANCE-STAR, Sept. 20, 1990, at 39. 
944 UNIVEilSITY OF mcHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:939 
As a legal matter, Stoltzfus was the most important witness at 
trial. Her testimony strongly supported the prosecution's theory 
that Strickler had committed the predicate offenses to capital 
murder of abduction and robbery. 21 Throughout her testimony at 
trial, she referred to Strickler as "Mountain Man" and Henderson 
as "Shy Guy."28 Defense counsel never objected to this. Predicta-
bly, the prosecution deployed this aggressive characterization of 
Strickler during the sentencing phase of the trial in its effort to 
persuade the jury that Strickler deserved the death sentence un-
der Virginia law.29 During its closing statements, the prosecution 
also worked this theme as part of its narrative-a theme that 
would have been substantially weakened, if not entirely crippled, 
with defense access to Stoltzfus's contradictory statements.30 
As outlined above, Stoltzfus was the jury's reportorial link to 
the awful events that the prosecution claimed led to the death of 
Whitlock. 31 In effect, it was Stoltzfus who gave the jury its por-
trait of what occurred; there were no known witnesses to the bru-
tal killing.:i2 Her description of Strickler's behavior at the mall 
laid not only a legal predicate for Strickler's culpability, but also 
the narrative foundation for the jury to classify Strickler as an 
alpha figure with a wantonly aggressive nature.:33 
Despite the clean, linear storyline at trial that Strickler was 
the ring-leader, there existed other Stoltzfus-generated evidence 
that never reached the proceedings and thus never became part 
27. Though the Court in Strichler found that other evidence was sufficient to support 
the robbery charge, I would contend that the defendant is correct in that the robbery 
charge "flowed almost entirely from inferences from Stoltzfus' testimony." Strichler, 527 
U.S. at 294-95. 
28. See, e.g., Striclder Trial Transcript, supra note 19, at 477-80. 
29. Strichler, 527 U.S. at 305 ("[T]he Commonwealth's closing actually did include two 
brief references to Strickler's behavior in 'just grabbing a complete stranger and abducting 
her."'). 
30. See id. at 305-06 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Stoltzfus's testimony helped establish 
the 'principle,' as the prosecutor put it, that Strickler was 'the aggressor,' the dominant 
figure, in the whole sequence of criminal events, including the murder, not just in the ab-
duction. If the defense could have called Stoltzfus's credibility into question, the jurors' 
belief that Strickler was the chief aggressor might have been undermined to the point that 
at least one of them would have hesitated to recommend death."). 
31. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. 
32. See Strickler v. Netherland, No. 3:95CV924, slip op. at 13-14 (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 
15, 1997); see also ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWI'l'NESS TESTIMONY: 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 5 (3d. ed. 1997) ("[R]esearch resoundingly proves that the story for-
mat is a powerful key to juror decision making."). 
33. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. 
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of the back-and-forth testing that is supposed to occur through ev-
idence disclosure, cross-examination, and opening and closing ar-
guments. Unknown to defense counsel was a bevy of conflicting 
statements that Stoltzfus made during her interactions with law 
enforcement.31 These communications were only uncovered during 
the course of federal habeas corpus investigation almost eight 
years after the trial. 35 
In one of these letters, Stoltzfus wrote to Detective Claytor, the 
investigating detective who interviewed her previously: 
I want to clarify some of my confusion for you. First of all, I tend to 
remember things in pictures rather than in over-all logical con-
structs. When I didn't remember any Mall purchases, I didn't re-
member being there. But my 14-year-old daughter Katie remembers 
different things and her sharing with me what she remembers 
36 helped me jo[g] my memory. 
In that same letter, she also apologized for her "initial times 
[being] so far off," and explained that she "placed the time around 
9:00 pm thinking [she] must have not gone in because the Mall 
was closing." Stoltzfus then explained that her new certainty 
about dates and times was based upon what her daughter and 
another person at the mall told her. 37 
Stoltzfus also admitted in this letter that she recalled visiting a 
store in the mall and only later, on the way back from that store, 
hearing a man in the mall yelling at a woman. She said that he 
"could have been the same guy who knocked on the [victim's] car 
window."38 She related "a very vague memory that [she was] not 
sure of," stating, "It seems as if the wild guy that I saw" earlier 
had run up to a bus, missed it, and then approached the blue 
car.39 She wondered, "Were those 2 memories the same person?" 10 
This was not the only exculpatory letter she wrote to the inves-
tigating detective. On January 25, 1990, she wrote that she 
"spent several hours with John Dean [the victim's boyfriend] look-
ing at current photos from which [she] made the identification [of 
34. See Strickler, No. 3:95CV924, slip op. at 6, 16-17. 
35. See id. at 16-17, 22-23. 
36. Id. at 8. 
37. Amended Brief for Petitioner at 26-27, Strichler, No. 3:95CV924. 
38. Id. at 26. 
39. Id. at 26-27. 
40. Id. at 27. 
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the victim]."41 She also thanked the detective for his "patience 
with [her] sometimes muddled memories."42 She stated that she 
"didn't believe [a crime was] what [she] saw until [she] saw 
Leanne's pictures."43 She admitted that, without the detective's 
help, she "never would have made any of the associations" that 
she made. 44 
According to Judge Merhige, the district court judge presiding 
over Strickler's federal habeas corpus review in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, these admissions of the unreliability of her 
memory were so significant, "[I]t provides a basis for which 
Stoltzfus's testimony might have been excluded altogether."45 
Even if not excludable, these admissions were directly and power-
fully contradicted, and therefore, they could have impeached her 
testimony at trial. 
Although it took several hours with the victim's boyfriend and 
pictures of the victim before Stoltzfus could identify Whitlock to 
the police, at trial she described Whitlock at the mall as being "a 
rich college kid," "singing" and "happy."46 At trial, she also de-
scribed the clothing Whitlock was wearing. 47 The inconsistencies 
with regard to the degree of detail she described to the investiga-
tors "were extremely material for cross-examination."18 
'I'here were other significant issues with Stoltzfus's testimony. 
At trial, she claimed she was "one hundred percent sure" of her 
identification of Strickler from photographs that the investigators 
gave to her. 49 However, according to the detective's report, "she 
could not positively identify Strickler but stated only that he 're-
sembled' one of the men she had seen. Stoltzfus stated that his 
hair color was not right."50 
The foregoing statements were not part of the documents that 
Strickler's defense counsel had access to via the Augusta County 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 28. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Strickler v. Netherland, No. 3:95CV924, slip op. at 8 (E.D. Va. Oct. 15, 1997). 
46. Id. at 6. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 7. 
50. Id. 
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Commonwealth Attorney's "open file" policy. They were part of 
the detective's file and never merged into the prosecutor's file. 51 
Open file policies are meant to operationalize transparency, en-
force Brady v. Maryland's edict that prosecutors disclose exculpa-
tory evidence to defendants' counsel prior to trial, and enhance 
efficiency by allowing defense counsel to review any and all doc-
uments within the prosecutor's domain.52 
To work properly, the open file system depends on both good 
faith and good management. Open file policies depend on cooper-
ation between law enforcement and the prosecution in order to 
ensure that the files that the defense counsel review reflect the 
totality of relevant information. In Strickler's case there was an 
obvious breakdown in cooperation or shared knowledge on law 
enforcement's part. Clearly, this information would have been 
valuable to Strickler's defense and its capacity to offset the prose-
cutor's ringleader theory of culpability. 
Not surprisingly, the nondisclosure of the Stoltzfus materials 
colored the basic character of the prosecution's trial narrative. 53 
The vacuum left little space for the defense to counter the aggres-
sive portrait of Strickler that Stoltzfus painted. To be sure, it 
made it harder to question the underlying felonies that exposed 
Strickler to the death penalty. Additionally, it foreclosed potential 
avenues of further pre-trial investigation. After all, the particular 
details in the letters would (or should) have caused defense coun-
sel to pursue those leads. 
That said, this essay's raison d'etre is not to argue a legalistic 
Brady reformulation of Strickler's case. Brady claims are always 
challenging to win due to post-conviction reliefs existential battle 
51. See id. at 17. 
52. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that "the suppression by the prosecution of evi-
dence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is ma· 
terial either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution"). See generally Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games 
Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531 (2007) (discussing how prosecutors often 
don't fulfill their Brady obligations of turning over law enforcement files). 
53. Strichler, No. 3:95CV924, slip op. at 11-14; see also William J. Bowers et al., Fore-
closed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, 
and Premature Decision Malling, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 1493 (1998) (demonstrating 
that evidence and arguments presented during guilt phase of a capital trial will impact 
sentencing decisions of juries). 
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with the legal system's preference for finality. 51 More primitively, 
post-conviction litigation must do battle with "confirmation bias," 
the strong human desire to preserve initial beliefs, opinions, and 
conclusions.55 Although I believe the Court missed the mark in its 
Brady ruling, my purpose here is to re-imagine the trial in light 
of current doctrinal, capital defense, and normative realities driv-
ing capital litigation in today's Virginia. 
In short, I strive to lift the veil on the death penalty's temporal 
arbitrariness by taking stock of important changed circumstances 
as they relate to Strickler's capital trial and its narrative, not his 
federal habeas corpus litigation. It may be tempting to push aside 
my thought experiment as mere counterfactual prodding, but any 
capital punishment regime should be prepared to answer all 
manner of inquiry. Death penalty regimes warrant a wide range 
of review: cost review, fairness review, demographic review, accu-
racy review, deterrent review, and even the kind of "soft" tem-
poral review underway here. Although we live in an age of empir-
icism, the democratic currency of our legal system is fundamental 
fairness and due process, two distinctly qualitative notions which 
strongly animate the core of America's civic identity.56 So with 
that in mind, what can we say about the fairness of Strickler's 
trial when viewed from a different point in time-a time marked 
by different doctrine, mores, and resources? 
II. THE TEMPORAL ZONE OF STRICKLER'S CAPITAL MURDER TRIAL: 
DOCTRINE, NORMS, AND RESOURCES 
A. Strickler's Limited Intellectual Capacity and Sentencing: 
Atkins v. Virginia and Increased Emphasis on the Role of 
Mitigation 
Strickler's status as ''borderline" mentally retarded and his 
background of severe deprivations were not narratively brought 
54. See Gershman, supra note 52, at 562. 
55. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 111 (2008). See generally Goutam U. 
Jois, Stare Decisis Is Cognitive Error, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 63, 64-65 (2009) (arguing that 
psychological evidence of cognitive bias gives reason to reject stare decisis). 
56. See Sawyer v. Hauck, 245 F. Supp. 55, 57 (W.D. Texas 1965); Margaret Jane Ra-
din, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 114~ 1151 (1980). 
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into focus during Strickler's sentencing phase. 57 An omission of 
this scope is a near de facto reflection of an absence of defense 
mitigation strategy.58 I discuss intellectual disability separately 
from the broader psychosocial history, but it is important to re-
member they are inextricably linked as a matter of capital de-
fense litigation. These evidence categories are directly related to 
divining who is the "worst of the worst"-a stated constitutional 
necessity for any death penalty regime. 59 Mitigation is the very 
heart of defense counsel's role at sentencing. 60 Both Strickler's in-
tellectual deficits and his upbringing were essential ingredients 
for launching a defense against the prosecution's mission to se-
cure the death penalty. The sentencing transcript reveals little 
more than defense counsel's anemic communication of undevel-
oped evidentiary scraps hinting at childhood hardships and intel-
lectual challenges.61 In other words, Strickler's chief mitigating 
factors were left untapped. 
Highlighting the overarching structural role of mitigation, the 
ABA describes counsel's duty to fashion a mitigation strategy as 
global in nature. It states, "The duty to investigate, develop and 
pursue avenues relevant to mitigation of the offense or penalty, 
and to effectively communicate the fruits of those efforts to the 
decision-makers, rests upon defense counsel."62 The duty to mar-
shal and present mitigation evidence in a capital case attaches to 
all stages of the proceedings.63 Toward this end, defense counsel's 
responsibility to create a mitigation strategy in narrative form 
cannot be overstated.61 
Unlike the intentional, targeted, and integrated mitigation ap-
proach that the ABA envisions, Strickler's defense counsel essen-
tially rendered his intellectual profile meaningless by neglecting 
57. Sentencing Transcript at 878-79, Commonwealth v. Strickler <Ya. Cir. 1990) (on 
file with author). 
58. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (both demonstrating the factual need to present individualized con-
sideration in order for the death penalty to be constitutional). 
59. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. 
60. Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death 
Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 677 (2008) [hereinafter Supplementary Mitigation 
Guidelines]. 
61. Sentencing Transcript, supra note 57, at 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 878-98. 
62. Supplementary Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 60, at 678. 
63. Id. 
64. See Burt, supra note 9, at 879 (internal citations omitted). 
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to develop and contextualize its significance. Strickler's IQ was 
measured to be 75, a number that soundly placed him within the 
zone of the intellectually limited. 65 Strickler's counsel called a 
neuropsychologist who examined Strickler for intellectual func-
tioning to testify at the sentencing phase.66 The total direct exam-
ination of the neuropsychologist was three-and-one-half pages 
long.67 One-and-one-half-pages detailed the neuropsychologist's 
credentials. 68 Defense counsel's only substantive questions di-
rected to the neuropsychologist were the following: 
Question: What does that [IQ of seventy-five] mean in terms of his 
range? 
Answer: A full scale IQ of seventy-five places his intellectual func-
tioning in a borderline range. The borderline range is in between 
mentally retarded and the low average range. 
Question: How many people in his age group would be above him in 
IQ? 
Answer: The average twenty-four-year-old male in the United States 
would achieve an IQ of a hundred so that places him at [the] fifty 
percentile. Meaning that ninety-five percent of individuals his age 
and educational background would achieve IQs higher than what he 
achieved. 
Question: Is that, would that in anyway affect his decision making 
processes? 
Answer: Intellectual tests are tests of verbal questions and visual 
and motor tasks that give an idea of how well someone thinks with 
regard to cognition, making appropriate choices, being able to work 
efficiently with their hands and it can be an indicator of how well 
someone will do, say, on a job or in school. 69 
Unfortunately for both Strickler and for society's. interest in 
zealous representation in capital trials, this line of questioning 
ended with the above.70 Defense counsel then immediately turned 
to five final questions requesting the names of the cognitive tests 
used and requesting minor details about how blocks are applied 
65. Sentencing 'I'ranscript, supra note 57, at 878-79 (testimony of Dr. Thomas Ryan). 
66. Id. at 878-82. 
67. Id. at 878-81. 
68. Id. at 878-79. 
69. Id. at 879-80. 
70. Id. at 880. 
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in such testing. 11 The questioning faded into a blase treatment of 
testing methods. 72 Glaringly absent were any attempts by defense 
counsel to educate the jurors concerning the effects intellectual 
limitations have on an individual's memory, judgment, aware-
ness, reasoning, and social interactions. 73 
Beyond the issue of Strickler's limited cognitive ability, Strick-
ler's other mitigation evidence, namely his psychosocial history 
(i.e., the detailed, exhaustive analysis of educational, medical, 
family, social, and other personal data) was directionless. 74 Apart 
from the neuropsychologist, the additional five witnesses called to 
testify at the sentencing phase were family and friends. 75 They 
were asked on average ten questions. 76 One witness, a neighbor, 
was called apparently to recount how as a young boy Strickler re-
turned a borrowed bike. 77 Another witness, also from the neigh-
borhood, was called and asked simply whether Strickler ever 
stayed at her house. 78 She answered in the affirmative and no fur-
ther questions were asked. 79 Her testimony totaled seven ques-
tions. 80 The transcript is a mere twenty-one pages long in its me-
morialization of defense counsel's direct examination of all six 
witnesses. 81 
In fact, the psychosocial report produced by the social worker 
asked to review Strickler's past was labeled "Not a Final Report" 
at the top of its cover sheet. 82 Nonetheless, neither the transcript 
nor defense counsel's files indicated that defense counsel made 
any effort to obtain a complete report. Such a report would have 
been minimally necessary for any hope of a substantively ade-
quate presentation of Strickler's background. 
How would a contemporary capital trial and its institutional 
actors-law enforcement, prosecutor, defense counsel, and ju-
71. Id. at 880-81. 
72. Id. 
73. Id.at 878-81. 
74. Id. at 882-98. 
75. Id. at 883-85, 887, 891-92, 894, 898. 
76. Id. at 883-98 (excluding questions for identification purposes). 
77. Id. at 892-93. 
78. Id. at 883. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 878-98. 
82. JANET WARREN, PSYCHOSOCIAL SUMMARY OF THOMAS DAVID STRICKLER 1 (1990). 
952 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:939 
rors-confront Strickler's intellectual make-up and his psychoso-
cial history if Strickler were charged, tried, and sentenced in 
2015? 
First, Strickler's intellectual profile is a major window into how 
time has altered the capital litigation landscape. From a doctrinal 
perspective, the ground has shifted enormously since Strickler's 
trial in the arena of protections for the intellectually disabled. In 
2002, the Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia that executing intel-
lectually disabled persons violates the Eighth Amendment's ban 
on cruel and unusual punishments.83 The Court devised a three-
prong analysis for determining intellectual disability: (1) the in-
dividual must show significant subaverage intellectual function-
ing, (2) the individual must have significant limitations in adap-
tive functioning for everyday living, and (3) the individual must 
have experienced these deficits prior to the age of eighteen.81 
Consistent with America's decentralized criminal justice model, 
the Court left to the states the role of implementing the particu-
lars of this paradigm, yet recently held in Florida v. Hall that the 
states cannot set a fixed numerical demarcation within the mar-
gin of error on any given intelligence test. 85 Relevant to the evi-
dence surrounding Strickler's intellectual status, the Court in 
Hall invalidated Florida's scheme, which enforced a strict limit 
against any exclusions for individuals with IQs over 70.86 The 
language of Virginia's death penalty regime has been interpreted 
by courts to have the same numerical break point of the sort in-
validated in Hall.87 
When the Court announces new categorically driven constitu-
tional constraints in cases like Atkins, in which residual proce-
83. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)). 
84. Id. at 318. 
85. See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. _, _, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000-01 (2014) (holding 
that although the State can set the parameters for defining disability, it must not foreclose 
further exploration of a potential intellectual disability if IQ score is within margin of er-
ror). 
86. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 1994, 2000. 
87. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (2008) (requiring at least two standard 
deviations below the mean on a standardized intellectual functioning test) and Hedrick v. 
True, 443 F.3d 342, 366-67 (2006) (finding that an IQ of 70 or less corresponds with the 
two standard deviations below the mean requirement) (citing Johnson v. Commonwealth, 
591 S.E.2d 47, 59 (2005) (vacated on other grounds); Walker v. True, 399 F.3d 315, 320 
(2005)), with Hall, 572 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (invalidating a Florida statute that re-
quires the same two standard deviations as the Virginia statute). 
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dural and definitional authority remains with the states, legal 
landscapes change in front-line, practical ways. From beginning 
to end, this different reality would strategically and fiscally im-
pact the prosecution's approach to Strickler's case if it unfolded 
today. Atkins's operational costs posed by the specter of addition-
al litigation concerning the issue of intellectual disability and the 
normative resistance to violating its moral meaning clearly im-
pact the decisionmaking of various institutional actors in the 
death penalty arena all across the nation.ss After Atkins, prosecu-
tors are less willing to seek the death penalty, juries are less will-
ing to impose it, and judges are less willing to uphold it. 
While Strickler was deemed only "borderline" in his cognitive 
abilities, this status would still carry more weight in today's legal 
setting and could be used in plea negotiations or litigated in con-
nection with sentencing. sn To be sure, Strickler's measurement 
would fall within the margin-of-error zone deemed problematic in 
the Hall case. Overall, despite Justice Scalia's concern in the At-
kins dissent about an avalanche of frivolous claims, only 7% of 
death row inmates had litigated this issue as of 2009.no In fact, 
15% of capital defendants who successfully litigated Atkins claims 
across the nation have had IQs measured above 70.91 
The attenuated linkage between intellectual disability and cul-
pability was one of the main rationales for the Atkins ruling. Im-
portantly, these arguments were being made at sentencing long 
before the Court outlawed the execution of the intellectually disa-
bled. A Sixth Circuit habeas case from 2006 involved a defense 
lawyer deemed ineffective for his sentencing performance in part 
because he failed to investigate and present mitigation related to 
the defendant's IQ of 77 as a basis for arguing reduced culpabil-
ity.n2 The Court of Appeals expressly noted the arguments under-
88. See generally ,John H. Blume et al., An Empirical Looh at Atkins v. Virginia and 
its Application in Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L. REV. 625 (2009) (demonstrating quantitative-
ly that post-Atkins litigation has not seen a flood of frivolous claims). 
89. Sentencing Transcript, supra note 57, at 42, 879 (testimony of Dr. Janet Warren 
and Dr. Thomas Ryan). 
90. Blume et al., supra note 88, at 628. 
91. Id. at 632. 
92. Dickerson v. Bagley, 453 F.3d 690, 691-92 (6th Cir. 2006). 
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girding the Atkins ruling as the foundation for what should have 
been defense counsel's mitigation narrative.93 
From the data we have thus far concerning successful Atkins 
claims and in light of Hall, we now know that in the hands of ca-
pable capital defense counsel, Strickler's intellectual profile 
would be eminently contestable in terms of a legal bar prohibiting 
his execution and be powerfully resonant in relation to plea nego-
tiations and sentencing mitigation strategy. Now it would be vet-
ted by the full array of institutional actors charged with the ad-
ministration of the death penalty in Virginia. Simply put, after 
Atkins and Hall, IQ and adaptive functioning would be a center-
piece of Strickler's defense team's approach in Virginia's contem-
porary capital defense litigation. 
Another altered dimension in today's capital defense litigation 
is a greater, more muscular approach to the role of mitigation, 
especially as it pertains to the all-important sentencing phase. 
One year before Strickler's trial in 1989, the ABA set forth com-
prehensive guidelines for the appointment and performance of 
counsel in capital cases, describing the expansive range of duties 
required to deliver effective representation in such cases.91 Those 
tasks included investigation into a defendant's medical history, 
special educational needs, employment history, family back-
ground, cultural environment, and other detailed biographical in-
formation.95 In 2003, the ABA returned to the subject of capital 
defense when it produced more guidance stating that effective 
capital defense necessitated the coordinated and collaborative 
work of a team of experts-lawyers, fact investigators, mitigation 
specialists, and other professionals. 96 These standards have slow-
ly, but imperfectly, taken root in the professional culture sur-
rounding death penalty litigation. They were not widely at play in 
1990 when Strickler was tried and sentenced. 
Professors Carol and Jordan Steiker have addressed the as-
cendancy of mitigation in death penalty litigation over the last 
twenty or twenty-five years in their analysis of how death penalty 
93. Id. at 698. 
94. AM. BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PEHFOHMANCE OF 
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (1989). 
95. Id. at 11.4.1 § 2(C). 
96. See Alv!. BAR Ass'N, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTHA L. REV. 913, 955 (2003). 
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reforms are aligning at a functional level with abolitionist goals. 97 
They write: 
'l'he transformation of capital-trial defense, reflected in the ABA 
standards (though not fully in capital practice) has been destabiliz-
ing to the continued use of the death penalty in at least two ways. 
First, like the additional layers of procedural safeguards wrought by 
increased legal regulation, the emergence of robust individualization 
and other trial-preparation standards has dramatically raised the 
cost of capital punishment. Capital-trial costs are stunningly greater 
than their noncapital counterparts. Second, robust individualization 
fits uneasily with many of the traditional and religious defenses of 
the death penalty, because it presumes that "an eye for an eye" is an 
inappropriate command; the death penalty decision must be as much 
a judgment about the offender as the offense.98 
In addition to evidence of Strickler's intellectual impairment, 
there was ample traditional mitigation evidence which would be 
more fully mined in today's mitigation-centered capital defense 
ethos. Strickler's life was replete with mitigation evidence. Multi-
faceted evidence existed to show that Strickler left school at the 
age of sixteen in the eighth grade, suffered severe violence at the 
hands of his alcoholic stepfather, and had signs of organic brain 
dysfunction. 99 Defense counsel also omitted Strickler's drug addic-
tion.100 His older sister and mother reported a chronic atmosphere 
of violence in Strickler's home. 101 He was thrown off a truck by a 
family member at age three and suffered a fractured leg, and his 
older siblings routinely struck him. 102 Post-conviction investiga-
tion also revealed multiple sources establishing that Strickler 
was often homeless during his childhood as a result of being ex-
97. See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Entrenchment and/or Desta-
bilization? Reflections on (Another) Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital 
Punishment, 30 L. & INEQ. 211 (2012). 
98. Id. at 233. 
99. See Sentencing Transcript, supra note 57, at 34-43, 878-98; Amended Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus at 47-48, Strickler v. Netherland, No. 3:95CV924 (E.D. Va. filed 
May 20, 1996). 
100. See Sentencing Transcript, supra note 57, at 889-91; Amended Petition, supra 
note 99, at 45. 
101. See Sentencing Transcript, supra note 57, at 887-91, 896-98; Amended Petition, 
supra note 99, at 48. 
102. See Amended Petition, supra note 99, at 48. 
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pelled by his stepfather. 103 Strickler's bouts with homelessness 
predated him entering puberty. 104 
Not only has the legal profession elevated the significance of 
mitigation strategy since Strickler's trial, but the Supreme Court 
has also been more willing to require it as part of the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 105 One exam-
ple is Rompilla v. Beard. 106 In Rompilla, the Court found that de-
fense representation fell below the level of reasonable perfor-
mance when counsel did not investigate their capitally charged 
defendant's previous conviction. 107 The Court concluded that in-
vestigating the prosecutor's file relating to the defendant's prior 
conviction would have unearthed important information about 
the defendant's limited intellectual functioning. 108 
In light of Rompilla and other cases, the Court appears ready 
to be a partner in the profession's sustained focus on the centrali-
ty of mitigation strategy. 109 Even as ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claims remain difficult to win, the Court is identifying mitiga-
tion evidence and strategy as a cornerstone in the delivery of a 
constitutionally adequate capital trial. Interestingly, Justice 
Souter highlighted the ABA's standards for capital defense coun-
sel in noting that lawyers should now be very cognizant of mitiga-
tion evidence as an essential part of constitutionally reasonable 
representation. 110 
Despite the essential role of mitigation in capital sentencing, a 
mitigation strategy never made its way into the jury's narrative 
understanding of Strickler's life. A detailed, comprehensive miti-
103. See Sentencing Transcript, supra note 57, at 897; Amended Petition, supra note 
99, at 48. 
104. See Sentencing Transcript, supra note 57, at 897 (discussing how Strickler had to 
"strike out on his own" at a young age after being kicked out of the house by his stepfa-
ther). 
105. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005); see also Strickland v. Washing-
ton, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (setting forth the two-prong test for ineffective assistance of 
counsel). 
106. 545 U.S. 374. 
107. Id. at 382-83, 389. 
108. Id. at 382-83. 
109. See generally Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 946 (2010) (finding that the state court 
failed to apply the correct prejudice inquiry when "counsel did present some mitigation 
evidence during Sears' penalty phase-but not the significant mitigation evidence a con-
stitutionally adequate investigation would have uncovered"). 
110. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387-88 & n.6--7. 
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gation narrative, at a minimum, would have meant that the jury 
had a human picture of a man they knew only as "Mountain 
Man."111 A well-crafted mitigation strategy had the potential to 
counter the deranged ringleader depiction of Strickler that Stoltz-
fus's testimony presented.112 Strickler's intellectual deficits and 
his childhood deprivations were strong independent bases for mit-
igation which should have been developed in a complementary 
framework for maximum effect. 
In sum, Strickler was sentenced without any targeted, strategic 
vision to humanize him in the minds and the hearts of the jurors. 
Post-Atkins and with the heightened emphasis on the importance 
of mitigation evidence in recent decades, Strickler's sentencing 
phase of his capital trial would be markedly more robust in the 
present moment in strategy, investigation, framing, and narra-
tive. 
B. Declining Public Support for, and Declining Prosecutorial 
Pursuit of, the Death Penalty 
Strickler was sentenced and executed at a time when Virginia 
was second only to Texas in total cxecutions. 113 Indeed, more 
Americans were put to death in 1999, both at the national level 
and in Virginia at the state level, than any other year post-
Furman v. Georgia. 111 Strickler and thirteen other Virginians 
were executed in the last year of the twentieth century. 115 Nation-
ally, Democrats supported the death penalty 2-1 during this time 
and Republicans supported it 7-1. 116 
Why 1999 was the numeric high point of state sanctioned death 
in modern America is a complicated question with a host of as-
111. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 270-73 (1999) (describing Stoltzfus's de-
scription of Strickler as "Mountain Man" to the jury). 
112. See supra notes 19-44 and accompanying text. 
113. Executions in the U.S. in 1999, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpen 
altyinfo.org/executions-us-1999 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
114. Executions by State and Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpen 
altyinfo.org/node/5741#VA (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Executions by State and 
Year] (Virginia execution statistics over time); Executions by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) [herein-
after Executions by Year] (national execution statistics over time). 
115. Executions by State and Year, supra note 114. 
116. 7 in JO Favor Death Penalty for Murder, GALLUP REP., Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 10. 
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serted explanations. My colleague, Professor Corinna Barrett 
Lain, writes that this era was one characterized by a "jurispru-
dential trend that was exceedingly hostile to death penalty chal-
lenges-and that trend was, in turn, part of a larger sociopolitical 
trend moving the same way."117 In the first nearly twenty years of 
the death penalty's modern era, prior to any definitive evidence to 
the contrary, many Americans could assume that the death pen-
alty's asserted retributive purpose was unsullied. 118 In short, the 
death penalty had many friends at all levels of the democratic 
pyramid-voters, jurors, prosecutors, judges-and it had yet to be 
questioned scientifically with the DNA revolution. 
In terms of the national electoral climate, the "tough on crime" 
political ethos that followed the 1960s was deeply entrenched by 
the time many of the trials that gave rise to the 1999 cohort of 
executions occurred. 119 On average, those executed in 1999 spent 
nearly twelve years on death row between their sentencing and 
execution. 120 Thus, many of these defendants had been tried in the 
1980s. That decade saw the beginning of the war on drugs era 
and the unveiling of the Willie Horton ad, which helped cripple 
Michael Dukakis's presidential campaign by marginalizing him 
as soft on crime. 121 The gruesome cable-televised coverage of Ted 
Bundy's execution for the serial murders of young Floridian wom-
en has even been suggested as a factor in the country's death 
penalty support. 122 
And what does today look like in terms of public support for the 
death penalty across the nation and in Virginia? Are capital trials 
affected by the ebb and flow of public support? 
117. Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DUKE L.J. J., 43 (2007) (emphasis in 
original). 
118. See Scott Shane, A Death Penalty Fight Comes Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013, at 
A14 (discussing Kirk Illoodsworth who, in 1993, was the first death row inmate to be ex-
onerated by DNA evidence); see also Maryland, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/maryland-1 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
119. See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text. 
120. Time on Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTH., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
time-death-row (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
121. See Op-Ed., George Bush and Willie Horton, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 1988), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11104/opinion/george-bush-and-willie-horton.html. 
122. See James Alan Fox et al., Death Penalty Opinion in the Post-Furman Years, 18 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 499, 510 & n.42 (1990) (discussing the Ted Bundy trial and 
its potential effect on public support for the death penalty). 
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All these years after Strickler's trial, the death penalty is in 
decline in Virginia and across the nation. 123 Maybe the fever has 
broken. 121 In the Commonwealth, there are fewer capital murder 
indictments, fewer capital murder trials, fewer death sentences, 
and fewer executions now than since the death penalty's rein-
statement.125 
For many reasons, deconstructing why and how the death pen-
alty has lost support and why the nation is producing fewer exe-
cutions is beyond the scope of this essay. The death penalty is a 
varied phenomenon across the thirty-two states that maintain 
it. 126 'l'hus, it is a creature of idiosyncratic political cultures with 
specific substantive and procedural laws governing death penalty 
schema. In other words, there is no unitary "death penalty" in the 
United States. 
Notwithstanding the complex patchwork that makes up capital 
punishment in America, there are macro trends broadly accepted 
as being contributors to the declining support of the death penal-
ty. As such, there is a working consensus among scholars and 
other observers concerning the factors giving rise to this im-
portant development. 
A widely noted contributing factor to the decline of the death 
penalty is the DNA revolution and the exonerations it thrust un-
123. Executions by State and Year, supra note 114; Executions by Year, supra note 114. 
124. See generally John G. Douglass, Death as a Bargaining Chip: Plea Bargaining and 
the Future of Virginia's Death Penalty, 49 U. RICH. L. REV._ (2015) (discussing the cur-
rent decline in death penalty use and the current practices surrounding the death penal-
ty). 
125. See Douglass, supra note 124, at _. Compare ACLU OF VA., UNEQUAL, UNFAIR 
AND IHREVEHSIBLE: THE DEATH PENALTY IN VIRGINIA 3 (2000) [hereinafter UNEqUAL, 
UNFAIR AND IImEVEHSIBLE], available at www.acluva.org/publications/deathpenaltystudy. 
pdf (noting that in the 18 years between 1982, when Virginia executed its first inmate un-
der post-Furman death penalty law, and 2000, there were 81 executions), with AM. BAR 
Ass'N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE 
VIRGINIA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT 1 (2013) (noting that between 1975 and 
2013, Virginia executed 110 inmates, meaning that in the 13 years between 2000 and 2013 
there were only 29 executions), and ,JOINT LEGIS. AUDIT & REV. COMM'N, REVIEW OF 
VIRGINIA'S SYSTEM OF CAPI'l'AL PUNISHMENT 17 (2002) (listing 170 capital murder indict-
ments and 64 capital prosecutions between 1995 and 1999), with VA. INDIGENT DEF. 
COMM'N, ANNUAL REPOHT 13 (2013) (noting that there were only 14 new capital case as-
signments in 2013). 
126. See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTH., http:// 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) [here-
inafter States With and Without the Death Penalty]. 
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comfortably before the American public. 121 In a steady pace since 
Gary Dotson became the first DNA exoneree in 1989, the Ameri-
can people have been confronted with a regular diet of faulty con-
victions for cases typically involving rape and murder. 128 As of to-
day, there have been over 320 DNA exonerations nationally. 129 
With regard to death row exonerations, 150 people have had 
their death sentences vacated, twenty of whom were cleared 
through DNA evidence. 130 Virginia alone has witnessed sixteen 
DNA exonerations. 131 Strikingly, a recent empirical study by a 
prominent death penalty scholar asserts that there is a 4.1 % er-
ror rate for those sentenced to death. 132 The public and its elected 
officials are slowly becoming hesitant about a practice that no 
longer has the veneer of infallibility. 
Other factors affecting the diminished support of the death 
penalty include heavy costs, international normative pressures, 
and changing demographics. 133 The emergence of life without pa-
role is also credited with ratcheting downward the public's sup-
port of this entrenched, controversial sanction. 1:i 1 Whatever the 
mix, the death penalty is in a slow, but persistent decline. 135 Six 
127. See Innocence: List of Those Freed from Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.cleathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-Jist-those-freed-death-row (last visited Feb. 27, 
2015) (listing twenty exonerations since 1973 in which DNA played a significant role). 
128. See History & Accomplishments, MJD-A'l'L. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.exon 
erate.org/mission/historyaccomplishments/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
129. DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocencepro 
ject.org/Content/DNA_Exonerations_Nationwide.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
130. Id.; Pennsylvania Governor Announces Moratorium on Executions, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6054 (last visited Feb. 27, 
2015). 
131. Eyewitness Memory Often Unreliable, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (July 26, 2014, 10:30 
PM), http://www.richmoncl.com/news/state-regional/eyewitness-memory-often-unreliable/ 
article_clc653f7d-c93d-576c-b5bf-e7122970bdd3.html. 
132. Samuel R Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are 
Sentenced to Death, 111 PROCEEDINGS NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 7230, 7234 (2014). 
133. See Art Swift, Americans: "Eye for an Eye" Top Reason for Death Penalty, GALLUP 
(Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/178799/americans-eye-eye-top-reason-death-
penalty.aspx (identifying cost as a basis for opposition to the death penalty); see also 
James Gibson & Corinna Barrett Lain, Death Penalty Drugs and the International Moral 
Marhetplace, 103 GEO. L.J. _(forthcoming 2015) (discussing various factors which have 
had an impact on perception of the death penalty). 
134. Gibson & Lain, supra note 133 (stating the low rate of support for the death pen-
alty where an alternative for life without parole is available). 
135. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans' Support for Death Penalty Stable, GALLUP (Oct. 23, 
2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/l 78790/ americans-support-death-penalty-stable. aspx. 
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states have repealed the death penalty in the last eight years. 136 
Various reasons for repeal have been proffered by the leading 
public officials in these states, including cost and anxiety over ex-
ecuting the innocent. 137 
Notwithstanding why, the normative milieu here and now is 
different than it was when Strickler was tried and sentenced to 
death, a time when support for the death penalty was over 70%.138 
Today, Strickler would have faced a community, prosecutor, and 
jury potentially more sensitive to wrongful convictions and the 
special status of the intellectually disabled. Also, these important 
institutional actors likely would have been more exposed to 
friends and family opposed to the death penalty. These factors 
matter even though they cannot be quantitatively measured. As 
criminal justice actors know deep in their bones, qualitative dif-
ferences-sociopolitical, psychological, narrative, demographic, 
and others-affect trial outcomes. 139 
No doubt this changed climate would have impacted Strickler's 
trial. It is clear that policymakers, prosecutors, and the public, 
136. States With and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 126. 
137. See Jeremy W. Peters, Death Penalty Repealed in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
17, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/17/nyregion/17cnd-jersey.html?_r=O (citing 
"sanctity of life" as a basis for removal of the death penalty); Joe Sutton, Maryland Gover-
nor Signs Death Penalty Repeal, CNN (May 2, 2013, 2:53 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/ 
05/02/us/maryland-death-penalty/ (citing lack of deterrent effect, cost, and "racial bias" as 
justifications for removing the death penalty); Christopher Wills, Illinois Gov. Pat Quinn 
Abolishes Death Penalty, Clears Death Row, WASH POST. (Mar. 9, 2011, 8:17 PM), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/09/ AR2011030900319. html (cit-
ing lack of certainty as a basis for abolishing death penalty); New Mexico Governor Repeals 
Death Penalty in State, CNN (Mar. 18, 2009, 11:06 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME 
/03/18/new.mexico.death.penalty/ (citing lack of confidence in the system as a basis for re-
peal of the death penalty); New Yorh, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenal 
tyinfo.org/new-york-1 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) (discussing the history of the death pen-
alty in New York and its abolition in 2007); No More Death Penalty in CT, NBC CONN. 
(Apr. 25, 2012, 7:22 PM), http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/No-More-Death-Penal 
ty-in-CT-148918245.html (citing "unworkability" as a basis for removal of death penalty). 
138. See Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Death Penalty Support Lowest in More Than 40 Years, 
GALLUP (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.gal lup.com/poll/165626/death-penalty-support-lowest-
years.aspx; see also Jones, Americans' Support for Death Penalty Stable, supra note 135 
("Since 1937, support has been as low as 42% in 1966 and as high as 80% in 1994."). 
139. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 360 (1979) (holding that a prima facie 
constitutional violation can be proven if females are excluded from venire); Bidish J. Sar-
ma, Challenges and Opportunities in Bringing the Lessons of Cultural Competence to Bear 
on Capital Jury Selection, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 907, 912-13 (2012) (discussing the im-
portance of humanizing a defendant to the jury through a cultural lens); cf. Edith Greene, 
Media Effects on Jurors, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443-44 (1990) (discussing the poten-
tial effect of the media on jury decisions). 
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even those who support the death penalty, bring a more cautious 
approach to the enterprise today. There is no reason to assume 
that Strickler's case would not have been meaningfully affected 
by the waning public support for the death penalty. He almost 
certainly would have been the beneficiary of the public's in-
creased hesitancy on the death penalty. 
C. Creation of the Capital Defender Units: The Benefits of 
Intentional Investment for Capitally Charged Indigent 
Defendants 
Virginia was well-known nationally as a low performer in the 
delivery of indigent defense at the time of Strickler's capital trial. 
At the time, there were inadequate qualifications for court-
appointed counsel. 140 A patchwork of public defenders and lawyers 
from court-appointed lists provided indigent defense in capital 
cases.
141 As of the year 2000, 97% of death row inmates since 1977 
in Virginia had court-appointed counsel. 142 · 
Strickler had two court-appointed counsel to represent him 
during his capital trial. 143 One was a public defender and the oth-
er was drawn from the private bar. Undoubtedly, they were both 
under-resourced and had not received adequate training in this 
complex area of the law. In fact, the public defender had been 
deemed ineffective in a previous capital case. 144 
Even apart from the Brady issue the Court agreed to hear, 
Strickler's trial was pocked with infirmities. Any full examination 
of the trial would expose many of the operational problems of the 
death penalty. 145 So often these problems are invisible to the pub-
140. See ACLU OF VA., BROKEN JUS'l'ICE: THE DEA'l'H PENALTY IN VIRGINIA 31 (2003) 
[hereinafter BROKEN JUSTICE], http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/broken_ justice. pdf 
(indicating the recent improvement that the Virginia legislature has made in ensuring 
better quality lawyers for capital cases). 
141. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 
CONN. L. REV. 85, 96-97 (2007) (referring to the poor quality of attorneys available for 
court-appointed lists). 
142. BROKEN JUS'rICE, supra note 140, at 28. 
143. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 277 (1998) ("In December 1991, the Augusta 
County Circuit Court appointed new counsel to represent petitioner in state habeas corpus 
proceedings."); see Case Note, Strichler v. Pruett, Nos. 97-29, 97-30, 1998 WL 340420, (4th 
Cir. June 17, 1998), 11 CAP. DEF. J. 145, 147 n.38 (1998). 
144. UNEQUAL, UNFAIR AND IRREVERSIBLE, supra note 125, at 18. 
145. See Initial Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Strickler v. Netherland, No. 
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lie at large and even to some actors within the system, as with 
the Stoltzfus materials. The mechanical problems that unfold at 
the sub-cellular level of criminal trials include the legal maneu-
vers, tactical omissions, and resource constraints that usually 
dictate the fate of capital defendants. 146 Unsurprisingly, Strick-
ler's trial had these problems as well. 
How might Strickler's capital trial have been different under 
Virginia's current capital defender units? What quality and re-
source differences would be at play? 
In 2002, the Commonwealth of Virginia created four regional 
capital defender units. 147 These units were designed so that capi-
tal-eligible defendants would receive more uniform, expert de-
fense services while facing the threat of losing their lives at the 
state's behest. 148 This was a major development in the history of 
the delivery of indigent defense services for the state. Virginia 
paid its court-appointed capital defense counsel less than any 
other state prior to switching to the capital defender unit sys-
tem.149 
In today's capital litigation environment, Strickler would have 
had a highly trained capital defender, along with a well-trained 
appointed co-counsel, whose sole responsibility would have been 
to meet the needs of their capitally charged defendants. 100 They 
almost certainly would have had direct access to a fact investiga-
tor and a mitigation specialist, both of whom would have been al-
so specially trained and singularly assigned for this work. 151 In 
3:95CV924 (E.D. Va. filed Mar. 7, 1996) (citing eighteen claims and seventeen subclaims of 
error establishing grounds for unlawful detention). 
146. See Stephen B. Bright, Death By Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional 
Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. 
VA. L. REV. 679, 685 (1990) (discussing how the lack of appropriate standards for inade-
quate counsel means death sentences are the result of the "luck of the lawyers [the de-
fendants] draw"). 
147. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-163.2, -163.7 (Cum. Supp. 2002); Va. Code Ann.§ 19.2-
163.2 (Michie Supp. 2002) Va. Code Ann.§ 19.2-163. 7 (Michie Supp. 2002), 15 CAP. DEF. J. 
283, 283 (2002) [hereinafter Va. Code Recap]. 
148. Va. Code Recap, supra note 147, at 284-85. 
149. SPANGENBERG GRP., AM. BAR Ass'N, A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF INDIGENT 
DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA 7 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/va_report2004.authcheckdam. 
pdf. 
150. See VA. CODE ANN.§§ 19.2-163.7-163.8 (Repl. Vol. 2008). 
151. See AM. BAR Ass'N, EVALUA'l'ING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STA'l'E DEATH 
PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE VIRGINIA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT iv (2013) [herein-
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this essay's time machine, the fact investigator may well have 
been able to unearth Stoltzfus's inconsistent statements, a devel-
opment that would have changed the complexion of plea bargain-
ing, the trial, and sentencing. Undoubtedly, the mitigation spe-
cialist would have systematically delved into Strickler's 
educational, family, medical, and social background. This, in 
turn, would have unquestionably led to a cohesive, compelling 
narrative at the sentencing portion of Strickler's trial. 
With regard to long-vocalized aspirational goals around parity 
and a level playing field between defense and prosecution in the 
indigent defendant arena, the prosecutor would have known from 
the outset that he would be dealing with a formidably trained and 
experienced defense team. This alone could have led to plea nego-
tiation benefits for Strickler. 152 In toto, these enhancements in de-
fense resources would today have an enormous effect on the qual-
ity, direction, and strength of Strickler's defense. 
Beginning with the reinstatement of the death penalty in Vir-
ginia in 1976, and including up until the creation of the capital 
defender units in 2004, 84% of capital cases that went to trial re-
sulted in a death sentence. 15a Between 2005 and 2011, only 47% of 
the same type of cases resulted in death sentences. 151 These units 
are widely viewed as repositories for subject matter expertise and 
dedicated professionals who infuse the process with this special-
ized knowledge.155 No doubt Strickler would have been better off 
in the expert hands of these legal advocates who now have the 
structural and improved, if not sufficient, fiscal infrastructure to 
support their democratically critical mission. The passage of time 
tells us that the existence of the capital defender units have sub-
stantially changed for the better how indigent capital defense is 
delivered. 
after EVALUATING FAIHNESS], available at www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admin 
istrative/death_penalty_moratorium/va_complete_report.authcheckdam.pdf. 
152. See Douglass, supra note 124, at_. 
153. EVALUATING FAIRNESS, supra note 151, at 142. 
154. Id. 
155. See Va. Code Recap, supra note 147, at 284. 
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III. IMPRESSIONS AND llYIAGININGS 
This case study about one man's capital trial and its narrative 
is a critique of how arbitrariness afflicts the death penalty in a 
strictly temporal sense. The cultural observer Malcolm Gladwell 
contends that so much of extraordinary success for athletes or en-
trepreneurs in life can depend on the year and month they were 
born. 156 Unlike in the happy Gladwellian sense concerning super-
achievers, in the death penalty arena, the kismet of time often 
controls which defendants live or die at the state's direction. 
Although the historicity of any case is quite obviously significant 
in a legal system that evolves over time through case law and 
statutory changes, Strickler's trial would be markedly different 
today. This is of greater moral consequence to a democracy than 
changes made to other areas of the law. To borrow a famous 
phrase, "Death is different."157 
Watershed constitutional rulings such as Atkins remind us that 
we really do not have a moral hold on this mighty power of the 
state to take human life. Rulings of this sort seem not to an-
nounce glorious new terrain, but rather they seem to be shameful 
admissions of what we already knew or deeply suspected. The in-
creasing ways in which the public is either rejecting the death 
penalty outright, wanting to limit its scope, or hoping that the de-
livery of defense services is strengthened to avert the retributive 
nightmare of executing the innocent make our "moment in time" 
death penalty system especially difficult to support in a modern 
society dedicated to notions of human dignity and transparency. 
As the modern era of the death penalty nears its fortieth birth-
day, the death penalty brings to mind the prickly adage that by 
forty you have the face you deserve. The face of the death penalty 
is worn and haggard. Its return trips for cosmetic nips and tucks 
are beneath the dignity of the world's major democracy. Our wish 
to rationalize the death penalty's operation through myriad legis-
lative and judicial interventions is a failed undertaking.158 
156. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS 22-23 (2008). 
157. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). 
158. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 97, at 211-15. 
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Most importantly, the backward glance of this essay illustrates 
how the temporal space of doctrinal developments, public policy, 
and societal mood is a major arbitrary factor in death penalty 
outcomes.159 These sociopolitical elements are by their very nature 
immutably time-bound and thus they burden the death penalty, 
and us-as the citizens in whose names the penalty is imposed-
with another reminder of its problematic, unsteady administra-
tion. Contrary to the hopes of reformers and retentionists, time 
has not healed what ails the death penalty. Instead, time exposes 
its decaying moral and operational foundation. If the past is in-
deed prologue, the future's interventions, short of abolition, are 
likely to be no different. Temporal arbitrariness has been the 
modern death penalty's one and only constant. 
159. Cf. JOINT LEGIS. AUDIT AND HEV. COMM'N, supra note 125, at 29 (demonstrating 
the importance of locality in capital crime outcomes). 
